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Abstract
The continued increase in the use of computer systems in recent times has led to
a significant rise in the capabilities of malware and attacker tool-kits that target different
operating systems and their users. Over the last several years, cybersecurity threat reports
have documented numerous instances of users that were targeted by governments, intelligence agencies, and criminal groups, and the result was that the victims ended up having
highly sophisticated malware installed on their systems. Unfortunately, the rise of these
threats has not been met with equal research and development of defensive mechanisms
that can detect and analyze such malware. Though newer techniques such as memory
forensics have been incorporated in digital investigations, there is still a huge gap in automated analysis for such frameworks. Consequently, inexperienced investigators have been
left with little chance of detecting the malware’s presence and even for experienced investigators, detection is still difficult in many circumstances and requires significant manual
investigation for a chance at success. This thesis documents our research efforts to close
this gap through the development of novel memory forensic capabilities aimed at detecting advanced, real-world malware that targets popular operating systems such as macOS
and Windows. This research is driven through analysis of numerous malware samples that
were used as part of espionage and criminal attack campaigns and the research objective
is to automate the detection of such malware through memory forensic techniques. The research includes the study of kernel and runtime source code of macOS and Windows operating systems to analyze the various components used to store information about application malware. The end results are new memory forensics techniques that can be leveraged
by investigators of all skill levels to detect userland malware in an automated, scalable,
xi

and flexible manner. These techniques have been implemented and tested within the open
source Volatility memory forensics framework.

xii

Chapter 1. Introduction
This chapter provides a brief overview of memory forensics, which is the primary
defensive strategy considered in this thesis. We discuss the details of memory acquisition
techniques and memory analysis frameworks that are used in this research. Userland runtimes of different operating systems are also described, as they play an important role in
the research. Finally, we provide the motivation, contributions, and outline for our thesis.
1.1. Memory Forensics
Memory forensics is the process of examination of volatile memory (RAM) for artifacts related to a digital investigation. Memory forensics has become mainstream in recent
years because it allows recovery of a wide variety of artifacts that are never written to the
file system and are therefore not available when performing traditional file system forensics.
Memory forensics mainly relies on finding information from the volatile data stored
in the physical memory of a digital device. Volatile data is temporarily stored in the physical memory while the computer is running and gets lost as soon as the computer is powered off. Earlier, during a digital investigation, the computer system was usually shut
down, and only its hard drive was analyzed. In recent days, digital investigators are advised to take a memory dump of the system before shutting it down before removing its
hard drive. Much important information related to clipboard data, browsing history, chat
messages, open network connections, the presence of malware, and so on can be retrieved
from a memory dump which may not be able to be retrieved through traditional filesystem
forensics, where only the data written to files are analyzed.

1

Today, many new trends and techniques have come up which may only be solved
through memory forensics. Currently, there is a rise in fileless and memory-only malware
[1] [2]. Fileless malware does not create any new files but modifies pre-existing files and
system configuration (e.g., the Windows registry), and is therefore very difficult to detect.
Furthermore, memory-only malware resides only in RAM, which renders most traditional
digital forensics techniques ineffective. Memory forensics is probably the only solution to
detect and analyze such malware. Following proper memory forensics procedures is therefore crucial in order to analyze and reveal information from such malware.
1.2. Memory Acquisition
The first step of performing memory analysis is to obtain a memory dump for the
digital device. A memory dump, also known as memory snapshot, is the capture of the
current state of the system’s memory. The process of acquiring a memory snapshot is
known as memory acquisition. Ideally, a special software that dumps the physical memory
of a device is required to perform memory acquisition. We have several acquisition tools
depending on the operating system, e.g., MAGNET RAM, MDD, Process Hacker, Winen,
FTK, WinPmem, MANDIANT Memoryze, WindowsSCOPE are some of tools used for
Windows memory acquisition [3]. For Linux we have tools like LiME, Linux Memory
Grabber, while for Mac we may use Goldfish, Mac Memory Reader or OSXPMem for
the purpose of acquiring memory. [3]. In our research work, we use macOS and Windows
virtual machines and take the RAM dump using the memory snapshot feature provided by
VMWare Fusion.
Memory forensics involve the reproduction of the data structures and algorithms of
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an operating system, and does not depend on the live system and its API to determine the
system state. Therefore, after a memory dump has been obtained, the snapshot is taken
offline and investigated by forensic experts. To analyze memory samples, an investigator
can use one of several available memory analysis frameworks. In the next section, we discuss some of these frameworks.
1.3. Memory Forensic Frameworks
With the rise of memory forensics, several memory analysis frameworks are now
available which are responsible for parsing and presenting the acquired raw data in a
meaningful way. The success of a memory forensics investigation relies heavily on the
sophistication and ease of use of the memory forensics tools provided by such frameworks.
By leveraging modern memory analysis frameworks, investigators can deeply explore
the address space of the kernel and each process as well as historical data left behind in
de-allocated pages. Current malware often uses highly advanced camouflaging techniques,
including the use of memory-only payloads and heavily obfuscated and encrypted code
and data. In recent times, malicious insiders have resorted to the use of encrypted file
system and network traffic. All these reasons combined necessitate memory forensic tools
that can parse a wide range of subsystems in both kernel and userland memory to fully
reconstruct system state.
Volatility [12] is one such widely used memory forensics framework, which is considered an industry standard tool in the field of incident response and malware analysis.
Written primarily in Python, Volatility has plugins to analyze Windows, Linux, and macOS memory dumps. In this thesis, we document our efforts to create new memory foren-
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sic tools for the Volatility framework and expand the capabilities of the existing Volatility
plugins.
1.4. Operating Systems Overview
All the modern operating systems such as macOS, Linux, and Windows primarily consist of two parts: a non-privileged part for user programs known as the userland,
and a privileged part for the low level programs that interact with the hardware, known
as the kernel. The kernel may be considered as the inner core of the operating system and
mainly consists of software that is crucial for the operating system to function. The kernel
typically executes with requires higher security measures and has a higher privilege level.
The userland, on the other hand, interacts with the user and usually has fewer security
measures and lower privilege levels. If malware authors gain kernel level access, they can
control the entire operating system. Although the kernel is usually protected from user
space, the userland may still use provided APIs, for example Core Audio and Core Video
APIs, QuickTime, etc. which may be abused by malware to record microphone audio, access web camera streams, capture keystrokes, and covertly gain screenshots of sensitive
data. In most cases, if suitable vulnerabilities are found in the userland runtime, it becomes an easy task for malware authors to create user level malware. Several userland
runtime environments that have been exploited by malware authors include the Android
runtime, Windows subsystem GUI runtime, and macOS runtime.
1.5. Motivation
We noticed that in the past decade, research was focused on the data structures
of the kernel. This focus was driven by the need to detect kernel level malware as well

4

as the fact that the data structures describing process data, networking artifacts, file system information, and many other common artifacts are stored within the kernel’s address
space. While the results of past research have led to significant kernel analysis capabilities,
there is a severe lack of subsystem and runtime analysis capabilities in userland. Given the
trend of all major operating system vendors towards strict code signing requirements for
3rd-party kernel drivers, there have been significant developments in userland malware, as
malware authors shift to an “easier” target. Unfortunately, defensive research has not kept
up with this trend, as existing memory analysis techniques generally only provide broad
extraction of userland data, such as extracting an entire process’ address space or specific
regions of a process. While these capabilities are certainly useful, they do not provide the
structured analysis of activity that is needed to fully analyze running applications and
code within process memory. We therefore tried to bridge this research gap in two most
widely used userland subsystems: the Objective-C and Swift runtimes of macOS, and the
.NET runtime of Windows. To advance the state of the art and to provide generic memory analysis capabilities against these runtimes, we examined a wide variety of runtime
data structures and related APIs.
1.6. Thesis Contributions
In this research, we also developed Volatility plugins that automate the extraction
of the structured runtime data for macOS and .NET runtime analysis. We also deeply analyzed a number of macOS and C# malware samples that abuse these runtimes. These
plugins are configurable and support operations such as searching for known-bad classes
and data, extracting all data matching a given pattern, and recognizing code patterns that
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are often abused for malicious purposes. The inclusion of these capabilities into memory
forensics workflows will allow even novice investigators to automatically detect sophisticated real-world malware.
During our research on the macOS userland runtimes, we realized that a huge number of memory pages in the macOS were being ignored by the existing memory forensic tools. Since the accuracy of our results from the userland macOS runtime research
depended on how well the page handling mechanisms were modeled, we decided to first
study the macOS page queues subsystem. We wrote Volatility plugins to reconstruct data
from these queues allowing a significant number of memory pages to be analyzed that are
currently ignored by memory forensics tools. This is a supporting but also very important
contribution.
1.7. Thesis Outline
The remainder of the dissertation is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, we consider closely related work. Our efforts to analyze the macOS page queues are documented
in Chapter 3. The analysis of the Objective-C and Swift runtimes of the macOS subsystem has been described in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, we discuss the .NET runtime of the
Windows subsystem. Finally, we give our conclusions and sketch some future work in
Chapter 6.

6

Chapter 2. Related Works
Although our research on finding the page queues and userland runtime analysis for
the Objective-C, Swift, and the .NET runtime is largely based on previously unexplored
methods, we would like to mention some of the past and ongoing research work related to
memory forensics, page queues, Windows runtimes, and macOS runtimes.
2.1. Memory Forensics
In the last fifteen years, there has been a substantial number of publications in the
field of memory forensics. The 2005 DFRWS challenge [4] is widely considered to have
been the catalyst for the initial research in this area. This challenge required development of tools that could parse a Windows memory sample in a structured manner to recover key artifacts. Such tools did not exist at all at the time and the challenge led to several novel research efforts [5, 6]. In the following years, many new capabilities for Windows analysis were added, such as analysis of VAD trees [7], the registry in memory [8],
and cached files [9]. Since then, there have been dozens of new capabilities added that are
all now a part of standard Windows systems investigations. Structured analysis of Linux
systems largely began with efforts to solve the 2008 DFRWS challenge [10] and has seen
considerable growth since then. Mainstream analysis of macOS samples began in 2013
[11] with the release of Volatility 2.3. Volatility [12] is the mostly wide used framework
in the field and provides significant analysis capabilities for Windows, Linux, and macOS
memory samples. The Art of Memory Forensics [13], a book written by four of the core
Volatility developers - Michael Ligh, Andrew Case, Jamie Levy, and AAron Walters, documents the modern memory forensic techniques related to macOS, Linux, and Windows
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operating systems.
2.2. Page Queues
There have been many research efforts to decipher the operating system-specific
encoding of invalid pages so that they can be located and incorporated into analysis. In
2007, several papers were published that addressed a variety of these sources for Windows,
including the recovery of invalid pages from paging files, transition pages, and prototype
pages [6] [14] [15]. Paging files, also referred to as swap files, are used to store excess pages
of memory that have not been recently or frequently accessed to free physical memory
pages for more actively used data. Publications by Stimson in 2008 [16] and Iqbal in 2009
[17] deeply explored the incorporation of paging files into memory analysis. In a blog post
describing the incorporation of paging files into the Rekall memory forensics framework
(Google, 2016), Cohen describes how invalid pages that are stored within arbitrary, nonpaging files in the filesystem can be recovered during address translation [19]. This is very
useful, as the on-demand loading strategy of operating systems only loads in pages from
files on disk into memory when they are accessed (“on demand”) or when they are part
of a read-ahead set for applications that access many portions of a file. To evade Linux
malware that maps regions with the PROT NONE protection flag, Volatility specifically
checks for pages marked as not present but that have the 8th bit in the page table entry
set, which signifies a “global” page. The full explanation is given in a blog post [20], and
the end result is that these pages are no longer hidden from Volatility even though they
are not marked as present within the hardware state. The addition of compressed paging stores has also driven considerable interest in the address translation mechanisms of
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operating systems. These stores are used to hold compressed pages inside of memory to
avoid the performance penalties of writing them out to disk. The power of modern CPUs,
combined with the performance of modern compression algorithms, means that a considerable number of pages can be efficiently compressed and decompressed from one physical page inside the store. Case and Richard analyzed these stores on Linux and macOS
in an award-winning 2014 DFRWS paper [21]. Microsoft did not add support for compressed stores until Windows 10. In 2019, FireEye released a three-part blogpost [22] [23]
[24] on Windows 10 compressed stores. The author of the blogpost, Omar Sardar, along
with Dimiter Andonov, presented their work on “Finding Evil in Windows 10 Compressed
Memory” at BlackHat 2019 [25]. This research demonstrated how to retrieve a compressed
page using the structures and algorithms in Windows 10 and that forensic artifacts (including reflectively loaded malware) could remain undiscovered if their techniques were
not integrated in Volatility and Rekall memory forensic tools.
2.3. Malware Memory Analysis
The Volatility framework provides a suite of plugins to analyze the GUI subsystem
of Windows systems such as wndscan, windows, wintree, messagehooks, etc. [13]. This allows detection of malware that leverages related APIs, such as for keystroke logging, monitoring of USB device insertion, and code injection. It also allows reconstruction of user
activity through mapping per-session data, reconstruction of screen views (screenshots),
and the recovery of values from input forms and menus. In 2013, Carbone in his malware
memory analysis series used these plugins to analyze various memory images provided by
Prolaco and SpyEye [26], and several malware samples such as the Stuxnet worm [27] and
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Tigger Trojan horse [28]. In 2014, Carbone examined Linux memory malware such as the
Jynx2 Rootkit using the Linux plugins provided by Volatility. In 2014, Wardle [29] discussed various macOS malware samples. Although this work did not involve any memory forensic efforts, the persistence mechanisms of various macOS malware were looked
at thoroughly and the paper also helped debunk the common misconception that “Macs
don’t get infected with malware”.
2.4. Userland Runtime Analysis
In the past few years, there has been some research related to analysis of various
runtime environments. We mention some of those efforts related to our research.
2.4.1. Android Runtime
There have been several efforts to analyze the data structures and effects of the
Android application runtime. In [31], the Android runtime was analyzed to recover the
classes loaded by an application as well as the metadata of those classes (instance variables, methods, etc.). In [30], the Android runtime was studied even further and algorithms were presented that allowed for location of class instances and decoding of variable
values. In [32], a system was presented for recovery of heap metadata and objects, which
led to recovery of a significant amount of application data.
2.4.2. Objective-C and Swift Runtime
There are several papers and blog posts related to the Objective-C runtime. In
2009, Neil Archibald (popularly known as nemo) published a paper in the Phrack journal
which discusses the Objective-C runtime data structures in detail [36]. In this article, the
author describes how the Objective-C classes and methods are represented in memory. In
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2016, Archibald published another paper which elaborates on how tagged pointers work in
Objective-C [37]. The data structures used in our research are the same as that described
by nemo, however, the purpose of our research is completely different from the paper
published in the Phrack Journal, as we utilize these data structures to write plugins for
Volatility and to provide memory forensics capabilities. Andrew F. Hay’s thesis published
in 2012 broadly talks about macOS memory forensics [38]. The author explains the memory acquisition and analysis techniques of Mac memory images with Volatility. The author
provides some test cases to demonstrate the forensic techniques. The book, Hacking and
Securing iOS Applications, by Jonathan Zdziarski, gives an insight into the Objective-C
runtime as well[39]. The Objective-C runtime source code, which is now open-source [34],
provides detailed documentation on Mac memory management and how the Objective-C
runtime works [35]. In 2016, Case and Richard published a paper that detailed ObjectiveC memory analysis [41]. The purpose of this effort was to develop Volatility plugins that
would detect the Crisis malware [42] within memory samples. To accomplish this, select
portions of the Objective-C runtime were analyzed to determine the address of class
method handlers. This allowed detection of method swizzling as well as malware that
registered keyloggers through the use of the addGlobalMonitorForEventsMatchingMask
or addLocalMonitorForEventsMatchingMask functions. Though novel, this research is
now largely outdated as it only supported analysis on macOS versions up to 10.9, which
stopped being supported in 2016. Due to the change in macOS versions, the algorithm
presented in this research for enumerating the loaded classes inside a process is no longer
valid. The detection algorithms utilized by the plugins are also very limited in their scope,
and leave much of the runtime information unexplored. For example, these algorithms do
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not fully enumerate all methods associated with an object instance and class methods are
only examined on two criteria. The first is based on the method implementation’s memory
region, and it is examined for being mapped by a file in a suspicious directory or being in
a non-file backed region. The second criteria is if the region is hosting a handler for one of
the previously mentioned event monitors. The use of these event monitors is not typical in
current macOS malware and the referenced work is unable to detect more popular modern
methods. This research also did not provide algorithms for decoding variable values, instead concentrating solely on enumerating names. This left behind strings and other data
that may be useful when analyzing malware and investigating malicious insiders.
There are also some recent blog posts on Objective-C and Swift data structures.
Ash has a series of Friday Q&A discussion articles where he primarily discusses the
Objective-C runtime[40]. These articles compiled in three book volumes discuss how the
Objective-C and Swift data structures are arranged in memory. Ash also talks about
method dispatch techniques and tagged pointers in the Objective-C runtime.
2.4.3. .NET Runtime
The bulk of information about the .NET architecture and runtime has been articulated in Microsoft documentation [86]. There are also several books, papers and blog posts
related to the .NET runtime. Some of these have been mentioned below.
In 2000, Richter described the details of the garbage collection process in .NET in
his two-part article [88]. Richter explains how resources are allocated and managed, then
gives a detailed step-by-step description of how the garbage collection algorithm works. He
also discussed ways to clean up properly after a resource’s memory has been freed. Richter

12

further documented the details of the .NET framework in his book [89]. In 2001, Gough
describes the details of the Common Language Runtime in their book: Compiling for the
.NET Common Language Runtime [90]. In 2002, LaMacchia et al. published a book describing the details of the .NET security features [91]. This book provides detailed information on the .NET Developer Platform Security, Code Access Security, Web Services Security, and .NET Framework Security for Developers.
There are several other books that give a description of .NET Framework including the CLR internals, the .NET architecture, .NET programming, and other features of
.NET. One of the most widely used books is The Book of the Runtime [92] which gives a
vivid description of the .NET internals. The .NET Framework Essentials [93] by Thai and
Lam is another book that provides an overview of the .NET Core Language Runtime, the
.NET programming core features and languages, and the .NET architecture. Pro .NET
Performance [94] describes ways to measure performance in .NET applications and discusses how to make these applications faster. The author Sasha Goldshtein has also presented his work in the .NET DeveloperDays conference and his work is now available in
the form of training materials [98].
Some of the most important resources for .NET runtime can be found online in the
form of blog posts. One of the seminal blog posts is on CLR runtime internals by Hanu
Kommalapati and Tom Christian [99]. This article is a part of the Microsoft documentation and discusses the .NET Framework 1.1. Although there has been several changes to
the source code during the version changes from .NET Framework 1.1 to .NET Framework
4.0., this documentation can still be considered as a valuable resource. Simon Cooper has
a four-part series of articles on the anatomy of .NET assembly [100][101][102][103]. In
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these articles, Cooper gives a detailed description of the .NET metadata tables including
the TypeDef, methodDef, and FieldDef tables. The different heaps including the metadata
heap, String Heap, User String Heap, GUID Heap, and Blob Heap are discussed in detail. Cooper describes the techniques to identify these streams and tables using the hex
dump of an executable. A comprehensive collection of research papers by different authors on various topics related to the .NET language, runtime and compiler source code
has been assembled by Matt Warren [104].Some of the research papers in this collection
has been described here. Sedgewick [105] describes a new variant of left leaning redblack
trees that uses one-fourth less code for common implementations while meeting the needs
of the .NET design goals. Herlihy [106] presented a new class of resizable sequential and
concurrent hash map algorithms known as the hopscotch algorithms to be adapted by the
.NET coreclr source. Kennedy [107] in their research paper discussed the design and implementation of generics for the .NET Common Language Runtime. Generics are specific
types that are to-be-specified-later and are instantiated when needed. Pizlo et al. in their
papers [108][109] discuss the garbage collection technique which is considered as one of the
most attractive features of .NET
A comprehensive list of .Net Performance Books, Courses, Trainings, Conference
Talks, Blogs and Most Inspiring Open Source Contributors can be found in this github resource compiled by Adam Sitnik [110]. A curated list of .NET blog posts has been recommended by Thomas Ardal[111]. This list includes blog posts by authors like Scott Hanselman, Michael Crump, Troy Hunt, Derek Comartin, Damien, Mads Kristensen, Iris Classon, Steve Sanderson, Ben Foster, and Mark Rendle.
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Chapter 3. macOS Page Queues
Data is stored and retrieved by operating systems in fixed sized blocks known as
pages. To enable memory analysis, memory forensics frameworks such as Volatility need to
translate the unordered set of physical pages in a memory sample into the structured and
ordered virtual address spaces in which the operating system and all running applications
operate. The process of associating virtual address spaces with their corresponding physical pages is known as address translation. Each hardware architecture defines the mechanism by which the hardware state describes whether a page in virtual memory is present
in physical memory.
Recovery of pages that are present in physical memory is trivial as the hardware
state encodes the offset in the memory sample. For pages that are not marked as present
in physical memory (i.e., “invalid” pages), the operating system defines the hardware state
to encode the actual location of the page, such as in a paging file, a file on disk, in a compressed data store, or elsewhere. The ability to decipher these invalid states and recover
the associated pages is a critical component of a memory forensics framework. If an investigator relies solely on pages marked as present in physical memory, a substantial number
of pages is left behind and negatively impacts results produced during analysis.
3.1. Data Structures Used
In this section, we describe the page queue data structures relevant to our research.
This chapter is based on the published paper: “Memory Analysis of macOS Page Queues” by Case,
Andrew, et al. in the Forensic Science International: Digital Investigation, vol. 33, 2020, p. 301004.,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fsidi.2020.301004
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3.1.1. The page handler
The vm fault internal function is defined in ( https://github.com/apple/dar
win-xnu/blob/main/osfmk/vm/vm_fault.c). The structure of the vm fault internal is
shown in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1. vm fault internal

The vm fault internal function performs the bulk of the operating system’s page
fault handling duties. The function vm fault internal begins by locating the memory map
associated with the virtual address that caused the fault. This is done with the help of the
vm map lookup locked. vm map lookup locked is defined in (https://github.com/apple/d
arwin-xnu/blob/main/osfmk/vm/vm_map.c). The structure of the vm map lookup locked
is shown in Figure 3.2.
The vm map lookup locked returns the vm map data structure associated with
the faulting address and the values of the vm object and vm object offset values. The
vm map data structure in macOS is the equivalent of the VAD structure in Windows
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Figure 3.2. vm map lookup locked
[7]. It holds metadata about a memory region of a process, such as the starting and
ending address, permissions, and mapped file, if any. The vm map data structure is
defined in (https://github.com/apple/darwin-xnu/blob/main/osfmk/vm/vm_map
.c). The vm object data structure is defined in (https://github.com/apple/darwinxnu/blob/main/osfmk/vm/vm object.h) tracks the physical pages of a particular object
and defines how to find the associated pages. For pages in physical memory, there is a list
of pointers to vm page data structures (defined in https://github.com/apple/darwi
n-xnu/blob/main/osfmk/vm/vm_page.h), one for each page. For non-resident pages, the
object tracks the pager responsible for gathering the pages. Pagers exist for data stored in
locations such as the compressed store or files on disk. The vm object offset is an integer
value that holds a particular page’s offset into its host object.
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3.2. vm page lookup and vm page buckets
Once the map, object, and offset are found, the page fault handler then uses the
vm page lookup function. The structure of the vm page lookup is as shown in Figure 3.3.

Figure 3.3. vm page lookup
The page fault handler passes the object and offset to the vm page lookup to find
the associated vm page. The vm page lookup first checks the per-object cache to locate the
object/offset pair, and if that fails it then relies on the use of vm page buckets. Although
we get some information about the object from the look-aside cache, for a complete recovery of data associated with an object, we must investigate the vm page buckets.
The vm page buckets is defined in (https://github.com/apple/darwin-xnu
/blob/2ff845c2e033bd0ff64b5b6aa6063a1f8f65aa32/osfmk/vm/vm_resident.c).
The vm page buckets is a hash table, defined in source file vm resident.c, that maps object/offset pairs to their corresponding vm page structures. This hash table has an entry
for each physical page currently tracked by the operating system, and it plays a similar
role to that of the page frame number (PFN) database of Windows [43] and the mem map
data structure of Linux [44].
Through our analysis of the page fault handler, we discovered that by analyzing
vm page buckets, a memory forensics framework can derive the physical offset of any vir18

tual address, even when the virtual address is marked as not present. The only exceptions
to this are when the virtual address truly has no backing physical page or when the page
is in an error state.
3.2.1. vm page and page states
In macOS, each physical page is associated with a vm page structure, which tracks
its associated object and offset, its current state, its PFN, and a few other pieces of metadata. The physical offset of a page can be calculated by multiplying its PFN by 4096 (size
of a hardware memory page on modern Intel processors). Before accessing a page, its state
must first be examined. Scrutiny of vm fault internal, as well as the vm fault page helper
function, illustrated that several problematic page states are skipped when the operating
system attempts to recover a non-present page. The page states that are skipped are unusual, error, busy, absent, fictitious, and restart. These states and others are enumerated
in the kernel source. Here is a list of such states:
• busy: page is in transit
• wanted: something is waiting for page
• tabled: page is in VP table
• hashed: page is in vm page buckets[] + the bucket lock
• fictitious: physical page doesn’t exist
• clustered: page is not the faulted page
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• pmapped: page has at some time been entered into a pmap (the memory map for a
process)
• xpmapped: page has been entered with execute permission
• wpmapped: page has been entered at some point into a pmap for write
• free when done: page is to be freed once cleaning is completed
• absent: data has been requested, but is not yet available
• error: data manager was unable to provide data due to error
• dirty: page must be cleaned
• cleaning: page clean has begun
• precious: page is precious; data must be returned even if clean
• overwriting: request to unlock has been made without having data
• restart: page was pushed higher in shadow chain by copy call-related pager
• unusual: page is absent, error, restart or page locked
• validated: page was checked
• tainted: page is tainted
• nx: page is nx
20

• reusable: page can be reused
• written by kernel: page was written by kernel
For pages that are not in one or more of these problematic states, the particular
memory queue that the page is on is then checked for suitability of recovery.
3.3. Memory Queues and Queue States
The queue that a page is currently on is tracked inside of its vm page structure.
The queues used by the macOS kernel to track pages are:
• Wired: pages that cannot be swapped. Similar to the non-paged pool of Windows.
• Compressed: pages that are being used by the compressed swap subsystem. They
must be decompressed before use.
• Free: several queues hold free pages.
• Throttled: previously busy pages eligible to be made active.
• Page Out: pages prepared to be paged out.
• Active: pages active in memory.
• Inactive External: queue of anonymous (non-file backed) pages.
• Inactive Internal: queue of file-backed pages.
• Inactive Cleaned: pages that were previously dirty but have since been written to a
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backing store.
• Speculative: read-ahead pages from objects recently accessed.
• Secluded: memory reserved for the Camera application.
A set of macros and constants is used to associate pages with these queues. Below
are some of the constants that are used:
• VM PAGE NOT ON Q (constant 0): page is not present on any queue, nor is it
wired, mainly a transient state
• VM PAGE IS WIRED (constant 1): page is currently wired
• VM PAGE USED BY COMPRESSOR (constant 2): page is in use by the compressor to hold compressed data
• VM PAGE ON FREE Q (constant 3): page is on the main free queue
• VM PAGE ON FREE LOCAL Q (constant 4): page is on one of the per-CPU free
queues
• VM PAGE ON FREE LOPAGE Q (constant 5): page is on the lopage pool free
list
• VM PAGE ON THROTTLED Q (constant 6): page is on the throttled queue,
anonymous pages are stashed here when not paging
• VM PAGE ON PAGEOUT Q (constant 7): page is on one of the page out queues
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(internal/external) awaiting processing
• VM PAGE ON SPECULATIVE Q (constant 8): page is on one of the speculative
queues
• VM PAGE ON ACTIVE LOCAL Q (constant 9): page has recently been created
and is being held in one of the per-CPU local queues
• VM PAGE ON ACTIVE Q (constant 10): page is in global active queue
• VM PAGE ON INACTIVE INTERNAL Q (constant 11) page is on the inactive
internal queue i.e. anonymous queue
• VM PAGE ON INACTIVE EXTERNAL Q (constant 12) page in on the inactive
external queue i.e. file backed queue
• VM PAGE ON INACTIVE CLEANED Q (constant 13) page has been cleaned to a
backing file and is ready to be stolen
• VM PAGE ON SECLUDED Q (constant 14) page is on secluded queue
By comparing a page’s state to its current queue, the kernel can decide if it is eligible to be retrieved during a page fault. Along with the previously mentioned macOS
kernel functions, we also studied the memory object lock page (defined in https://gith
ub.com/apple/darwin-xnu/blob/2ff845c2e033bd0ff64b5b6aa6063a1f8f65aa32/osfmk
/vm/memory_object.c) and vm pageout scan (defined in https://github.com/apple/d
arwin-xnu/blob/2ff845c2e033bd0ff64b5b6aa6063a1f8f65aa32/osfmk/vm/vm_pageout
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.c) functions to determine the full relationship between pages, page states, and the page
queues.
3.4. Memory Analysis of Page Queues
After studying the kernel source related to the page fault handler and the paging
subsystem, we were able to develop a memory forensics algorithm that successfully recovers pages that are still in memory but marked as being non-present in the hardware
page state. This algorithm involves the following steps. First, for a given virtual address
in an address space, it must be determined if there is a corresponding vm page structure.
Second, if the corresponding structure exists, it must be checked for eligibility to be recovered based on its state and current memory queue. Finally, its physical offset must be
extracted so that the corresponding data can be used during analysis.
3.4.1. Finding vm page structure
We achieved this step using two different methods.
Method I
This method was mostly implemented to aid our understanding of the page queues
and to provide statistical analysis. In this method, we enumerate every page tracked by
the vm page buckets and report each page’s metadata. We follow the following steps.
First, we create an array of vm page bucket t typed elements and with an array size determined by the vm page bucket count global variable. Each bucket of the array references a
list of vm page instances. Next, for each instance eligible for recovery, the plugin prints the
vm page address, its Page Frame Number, the address of the page’s corresponding object,
its offset in the object, and which queue the page is stored in.
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Method II
In this method, we replicate the macOS page fault handler’s ability to locate vm page instances for specific non-present virtual addresses in specific contexts.
This method includes the following steps. First, we locate the map data structure
vm map entry instance corresponding to the given virtual address with the help of
the Volatility get proc maps function. Then, we discover the object corresponding to the
map and the map’s offset into that object.
We mentioned that in the second step of this method, we need to extract the object and its offset. Extracting the offset is straightforward as it is simply an integer field
in the map data structure. However, extracting the object requires the following steps.
First, we access the object structure. The pointer to this structure inside of the map is
embedded inside a union, as a map can represent either an actual object or a submap. The
object structure is shown in Figure 3.4.

Figure 3.4. vm map object

We then check for maps that are sub-maps by examining the is sub map member
and bailing out if it is set. For actual objects, after getting the initial object structure,
it must then be checked to see if it has a shadow object [45]. Shadow objects are created
when an object is copied, such as during a process fork. Changes (writes) to the object
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are propagated to the shadow object by other objects that shadow it. To use the correct
object structure, our code uses the shadow object of map objects when they are present.
After finding the map corresponding to a given virtual address and extracting the
correct offset and object, our plugin is able to calculate an index into the vm page buckets
hash table. This is the same operation performed by the macOS page fault handler and
its use of the vm page hash macro, defined in (https://github.com/apple/darwin-xnu
/blob/2ff845c2e033bd0ff64b5b6aa6063a1f8f65aa32/osfmk/vm/vm_resident.c). By
indexing the table directly, we can quickly narrow our search to just a single bucket list of
vm page instances. In our testing, these lists are generally very small, usually less than ten
elements. To determine the matching vm page instance, we use the same algorithm as the
page fault handler, which matches the extracted object and offset with those embedded in
the vm page. Through use of this algorithm, we are able to quickly determine which if any
vm page instance references our given virtual address and context.
Once a vm page instance is found, we must then verify that the data at its referenced page frame number is suitable for recovering. The suitability of an instance is first
determined by examining its unusual, error, absent, and fictitious state members. Although the macOS handler also skips the busy and restart states, these are states our code
can work around. As mentioned previously, if the page is in any of the error states then
the corresponding physical page must be ignored. After examining its state, the queue on
which the page resides must be examined. Our code considers pages in the wired, throttled, page out, active, inactive internal, inactive external, internal cleaned, speculative,
and secluded states to be suitable for recovery. All of these pages that are still in memory,
but are marked as non-present in the particular address space being examined. We skip
26

pages in the compressed state as previous work incorporated recovery of these [46] and
furthermore, the next release of Volatility will support transparent RAM decompression.
We also skip pages on any the free queues as we do not currently believe that these pages
are in a suitable state for recovery based on our reading of the kernel source code.
3.5. Testing Environment and Data Set
To test our algorithms, we generated a corpus of memory samples with diverse operating system version and hardware configurations. In this section we describe the memory samples generated as well as the system used to test our Volatility integration.
3.5.1. Memory Samples
Table 3.1 lists the memory samples generated for testing our integration. Using
VMware, we created 2GB and 4GB samples covering every version of macOS from the latest Catalina all the way back to Mavericks, which is the same version coverage provided
by Volatility itself. The use of small memory sizes was simply for expedience and to illustrate that pages are present in the queues for a variety of versions of macOS. Obviously
the number of pages for the 2GB systems, which were booted and then immediately analyzed, will be small, but pages are still present in the queues. The 64GB and 128GB samples were taken from a MacBook Pro and a Mac Pro. These are the daily use systems of
two members of the research team and were used to provide real world data sets.
Memory snapshots of the virtual machines were acquired using VMWare’s built in
facilities [47]. Memory snapshots of the physical systems were acquired using Surge Collect Pro [48]. All of the virtual machine systems were acquired within an hour of being
booted. The MacBook Pro had an up-time of 41 days when acquired and the Mac Pro 30

27

days. If systems with 64GB and 128GB had been recently rebooted, the number of pages
present in the queues would be much smaller, mirroring the 2GB VM cases more closely.
The point is that pages are definitely present in the queues across a wide variety of system configurations and system up-times and therefore it is clearly necessary to introduce
measures to ensure this data is acquired.
Table 3.1. Memory Samples Used for Testing
#
Name
Version Build Size (GB)
1 Mavericks
10.9.5
13F1712
2
2
Yosemite
10.10.5 14F1021
2
3 ElCapitan 10.11.4
15E65
2
4
Sierra
10.12.5
16F73
2
5 HighSierra 10.13.5
17F77
2
6
Mojave
10.14.5
18F132
2
7
Catalina
10.15.2
19C57
2
8
Mojave
10.14.4
18E226
4
9
Catalina
10.15.1
19B88
16
10 Catalina
10.15.2
19C57
64

3.6. Page State Statistics
Before leveraging vm page buckets to aid in address translation, we first wanted to
understand the state and purpose of pages that are actively tracked by the buckets. We
used Method I to locate the vm page structure mentioned earlier to determine the relationship between RAM size and the number of tracked pages, how many pages are in a
state suitable for use in address translation, and the distribution of pages across the various queues. Table 3.2 lists the distribution of page states for each sample in our data set.
The number of pages in the file cache are separated from the other recoverable pages as
their exact purpose is known just from being in that queue. Unfortunately, identification
of pages in the file cache is only possible starting with Sierra so the samples from older
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versions have the file cached marked as N/A. Pages in the file cache queue always correspond to portions of cached files from disk, regardless of whether any processes are actively mapping the file. The pages that are in a recoverable state, but not in the file cache,
are counted in the Other column. This includes pages belonging to anonymous memory,
stacks, heaps, and other non-file backed regions. Only a relatively small number of pages
were kept in the various free page queues, which constitute the Invalid column count.
Analysis of the distribution showed that a significant percentage of physical pages in each
sample were tracked in the page buckets and directly recoverable through examination of
the corresponding vm page instance.
Table 3.2. Physical Page Queue Distribution
#
File
Other
Invalid
1
N/A
229,591
364
2
N/A
396,138
1,568
3
N/A
400,618
1,001
4 34,674
214,979
693
5 37,581
446,832
3
6 67,574
387,421
14
7 27,874
460,329
12
8 88,104
686,018
0
9 361,541 1,976,958
4,386
10 747,269 14,138,592 103,475

3.7. Address Space Evaluation
After understanding the distribution of pages across physical memory, we then
wanted to test and leverage our newly developed address space to examine process memory. We started with examination of process memory regions critical to memory analysis. This was performed to determine precisely how much of previously unavailable critical
process data could be recovered through analysis of the queues. Our first experiment was
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the examination of the stacks and heaps. In the next experiment, we examined the contents of the process executables.
3.7.1. Recovery of Stack and Heap Data
The process runtime stack holds metadata and data related to function calls. Depending on the compiler, programming language used, and the calling convention, this
information can include return values, return addresses, function parameters, and local
variables to functions. Analysis of stack data has a long history in memory forensics to
uncover call stacks, parameters passed to sensitive APIs, and more. A process’ heaps are
what hold the dynamically generated data processed by the application and its associated
libraries, frequently including artifacts such as keystrokes, images viewed or downloaded,
HTTP requests and responses, copy/paste buffers, and other valuable forensic artifacts.
Due to the forensic value of the contents of stacks and heaps, we wanted to determine how many pages belonging to these regions could be recovered through the use of the
queues. To start this analysis, we walked each process’ set of memory mappings and then
filtered for only those related to stacks and heaps and only those of 50MB or less. The
50MB restriction is to eliminate issues with data smear. It then attempted to translate
the virtual address of each page within these regions and kept a count of how many pages
translated to a physical offset and how many did not. This plugin was run twice against
every sample in our data set. The first run was with an unaltered version of Volatility, and
the second was with a version that had our new address space installed. Table 3.3 documents the result of this experiment. As illustrated, a substantial number of critical pages
are made available through analysis of the queues.
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Table 3.3. Analysis of Stacks and Heaps Pages
#
Total
Valid without AS Valid with AS
1
231,508
8,248
11,565
2
452,008
50,024
54,849
3
442,254
61,366
66,679
4
588,739
59,538
76,055
5
518,504
66,299
68,248
6
220,230
24,458
25,533
7
776,664
69,889
79,377
8 2,999,337
106,712
220,213
9 11,216,197
49,750
479,436
10 17,411,435
17,604
383,827
3.7.2. Process Executable Recovery
Our second test involved attempting to recover the process executable for every
running process in the data set of memory samples. This is a very common operation during analysis as recovering the executable from process memory provides several extremely
beneficial advantages, but there are also several impediments to successful recovery.
Benefits and Impediments
The benefits to process executable recovery include, but are not limited to, the following:
Defeating Packers
Upon execution, unpackers will usually de-crypt/decompress/de-obfuscate strings
and code from disk into their plain-text forms in memory. Recovery of these plain text
versions saves substantial reverse engineering time and effort [49].
Recovering Injected Code
Code injecting malware replaces legitimate code in the address space of running
processes with malicious alternatives. These changes to the code are not reflected back to

31

the file on the file system and require memory forensics to detect. Common examples of
such techniques are API hooks [13] and process hollowing [50].
Recovery of Command and Control Data
Malware will often dynamically load configuration data from a remote command
and control server. These configuration options can include a list of servers to exfiltrate
information to, commands to run on the local system, and more. Such data is not available in the executable on the file system, but is available in the address spaces of actively
executing malware.
These benefits cannot be fully realized when any of the impediments that hinder
the ability to fully recover the executable or to recover it at all are present. The largest
issue is that, to fully and properly recover an executable, its metadata must be available.
This metadata encodes the layout and size of all of the file’s sections and tells the memory
forensics framework how to reconstruct the executable. The majority of this metadata is
in the file’s header, which will be mapped into the first page of the executable’s memory
region.
Unfortunately, since the header is never or rarely referenced after initial process
loading, it is often a target of the swap manager since it will be not have been recently
accessed. This will then remove the header’s page from the process’ address space, and
with the header gone the memory forensics framework will produce an empty file when
attempting to recover the executable.
Even when the header is present, analysis is still hindered in situations where many
of the executable’s pages are not present. Particularly in situations where an analyst
wants to perform full static analysis of an executable from memory, it is very important to
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recover as much original data as possible as most reverse engineering tools are intolerant
of corrupted executables.
We note that these issues related to recovering process executables affect analysis of
all operating systems and not just macOS.
Executable Headers and the Queues
Our goal in testing process executable recovery was two-fold. First, we wanted to
test whether incorporation of the queues could allow for recovery of the executable header
for more processes than traditional translation provided. Second, we wanted to test how
much more data inside of executables we could recover by processing the queues. To recover process executables, we relied on the existing mac procdump Volatility plugin, which
examines Mach-O files in memory and uses the metadata to properly reconstruct each section. We then ran the plugin twice as with mac walk stack heap, once in an unaltered version of Volatility and once in a version with our address space installed.
The results of this experiment showed that there were 1,893 active processes in total across our data set. Without our address space being active, 749 of these were recovered and 1,144 were written as empty files. This produced 419MB of data. With our address space active, 1,366 executables were recovered and only 527 were written as empty
files. This produced 943MB of data in total. Table 3.4 lists the number of processes recovered with and without our address space active for each sample.
As shown in the table, a substantial number of previously unavailable executable
headers become available with the use of our new queue-aware address space. This is exemplified in samples 9-10 as they were acquired on long running systems with substan-
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#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Table 3.4. Number of Processes Recovered
Active Processes Without AS By AS
46
45
1
85
84
1
90
90
N/A
112
103
1
116
115
1
56
53
3
128
116
10
240
127
104
466
12
238
554
4
259

tially more processes and real-world work loads, all of which contribute to headers being
made not-present over time by the swap manager. These results show that our developed
address space has the potential for significant real-world benefits during investigations.
Executable Data Recovery with the Queues
As mentioned previously, it is not just the headers of executables that can be made
not present, but also any other portion of the executables as well. To maintain alignment,
memory forensics will fill these missing pages with zeroes (NULL bytes). This can have
severe, negative effects on the reverse engineering process as well as other types of forensics analysis. To further test the usefulness of our address space, we calculated how many
pages of data belonging to executables were successfully recovered by mac procdump in
both runs.
The column marked as ‘Total’ in Table 3.5 lists the total number of pages in executables that mac procdump tried to access but could not recover as it did not have our
address space installed. The column marked as ‘Recovered’ lists the number of pages in
executables that were recovered by mac procdump once it got our address space installed.
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The ‘Recovered %’ lists the percentages of the pages recovered with the help of our address space.
Table 3.5. Number of Processes Recovered
# Total Recovered Recovered %
1 3,679
908
24.68
2 11,325
3,260
28.79
3 12,251
2,584
21.09
4 12,181
4,064
33.36
5 13,857
4,958
35.78
6 6,340
481
7.58
7 15,522
1,895
12.20
8 20,238
3,647
18.02
9 11,613
271
2.33
10
102
66
64.71

As shown in the results, our address space provided the ability to recover a substantial number of pages belonging to process executables that otherwise would have been
missed. Through use of our address space, analysts will be provided with much richer and
complete data sets and artifacts to perform their investigations.
Performance Impact
To assess the performance impact of our address space on analysis, we timed the
execution of the previously described mac procdump-based analysis as well as monitored
memory usage during the plugin’s execution. The memory usage is based on the caching
the address space does to avoid repeated calculations related to enumerating process
mappings and object/offset calculations and lookups. Even on the large samples, these
caches combined for only a few MBs of extra memory usage. Table 3.6 lists the runtime
for mac procdump with and without the address space installed.
Of course this minimal performance hit is far outweighed by the forensic informa-
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Table 3.6. Runtime of mac procdump in Seconds
# Runtime Without AS Runtime with AS
1
20.25
26.24
2
31.14
40.54
3
38.88
40.46
4
32.99
42.18
5
32.02
40.74
6
22.89
30.27
7
23.94
31.47
8
27.88
61.40
9
21.13
277.02
10
19.01
549.46
tion that is gained. The only samples that experienced substantial runtime spikes were
samples #9 and #10. As shown previously in Table 3.4, sample #9 is the sample for
which the address space recovered a further 238 processes compared to the non-queue
aware Volatility. As a result of these 238 extra processes, the amount of data produced
by the plugin for that sample grew from 46MB to 234MB. For sample #10, a further
259 processes were recovered, and the amount of data recovered went from 444KB (kilobytes) to 291MB. The few extra minutes these invocations take to run are well worth the
substantial amount of extra forensic data.
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Chapter 4. Analysis of the Objective-C and Swift Runtimes
Once we were able to reconstruct data from the page queues, we could find a significant number of memory pages that were earlier being ignored by memory forensics
tools but could now be analyzed. We then focused our attention to find macOS runtime
information in memory. In this chapter, we document our research effort to study the
Objective-C and Swift runtimes of macOS. These runtimes power a number of common
macOS applications and are also the programming language of choice for a variety of malware samples and toolkits. Given the significant market share of Macs in both enterprise
and home environments [51] as well as the targeting of Mac users by nation-state backed
threat actors [52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57], it is necessary for analysts to have full visibility of
these runtimes.
4.1. Objective-C Memory Analysis
Objective-C is the primary userland runtime provided by Apple for development on
its platforms [58]. It features a C-like syntax, but with features that allow for quicker and
simpler development. Part of this feature set is a wide range of APIs that allow for direct interaction with numerous subsystems, including those that manage hardware devices
and interface with users and user-driven activity. Given its prevalence on macOS systems
along with its history of abuse by malware, being able to deeply analyze the runtime is
necessary for complete investigations.
Providing full analysis of this runtime required several artifact recovery capabilities
to be developed, including enumeration of the following:
This chapter is based on the published paper: “Modern macOS Userland Runtime Analysis” by
Manna, Modhuparna, et al. in Forensic Science International: Digital Investigation, vol. 38, 2021, p.
301221., https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fsidi.2021.301221
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• All loaded classes within a process
• The location of instances of each class
• The instance variables of each class
• The type-specific values of all instance variables
• The methods of each class
Through recovery of this substantial data set on a per-process basis, we were able
to develop a variety of plugins that allow for full structured analysis of Objective-C.
4.1.1. Enumerating Loaded Classes
Prior to macOS version 10.10, each loaded class was tracked by the realized class hash
global variable. Starting with macOS 10.10 and continuing through the latest version, which is 10.15.7 at the time of writing, classes were instead tracked by the
gdb objc realized classes global variable. The gdb objc realized classes is of type NXMapTable and is defined here ( https://github.com/opensource-apple/objc4/blob/cd
5e62a5597ea7a31dccef089317abb3a661c154/runtime/objc-runtime-new.mm#L910).
Enumeration of this variable allows recovery of the objc class structure used to represent
each class in memory. Inside this structure, there are references to the definition of each
class’ variables and methods.
To find the per-class information, the data pointer of the class must be decoded.
In Objective-C versions prior to macOS 10.15, this was accomplished by first following
the bits member of the class. This value was then masked with the FAST DATA MASK
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value of 0x7ffffffffff8 for 64-bit systems. This then provided the address of the class rw t
data structure, which provides references to the class ro t data structure along with other
class values. class ro t can then be used to recover the base methods, name, instance variables, and properties of the class. Figure 4.2 shows the code snippet where we locate
the objc class using Volatility’s pre-defined Object() method. The Object() method uses
the address offset and the address space to locate a particular data structure. We then
find the bits member and mask the value with the FAST DATA MASK which we have
initialized earlier (not shown in the code). The offset thus obtained helps to locate the
class rw t structure. In Figure 4.3, we see that the class rw t structure contains a data
structure of type class ro t. If we look at the structure of the class ro t, we see the name
field which can be used to recover the names of the classes. Starting with macOS 10.15,
the class rw t structure was changed so that the data pointer could point to either the
class ro t data structure directly or to a class rw ext t structure that contained the ro
pointer. This change was encapsulated into a PointerUnion whose flag value determined
which data structure the pointer referenced. This change breaks code that only understands the runtime before 10.15.

Figure 4.1. Objective-C Object

4.1.2. Locating Class Instances
The objc object structure is used to represent each instance of a class. Figure 4.1
shows the layout of the objc object data structure. To locate each instance of a particular
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Figure 4.2. Code Snippet for Finding Class Names
class, the heap region(s) of the process must be scanned, since Objective-C simply allocates the space for an object instance through malloc or calloc and does not specifically
track each instance afterwards.
Luckily, we can use the first member of objc object, isa, as both a scanning marker
as well as for context. This is possible as the isa variable points to the objc class that that
defines the object. By first enumerating all classes as described previously, we can then
scan the heap memory and look for any addresses that reference a loaded class.
Since our recovery algorithm relies on scanning, our plugins not only find the
current set of object instances, but also find deallocated instances. This provides significant analysis capabilities as long-running processes can have a substantial number of
deallocated instances still left within the heap regions. Special care must be taken when
parsing these instances though as pointers to variable data and method references can
lead to buffers that have since been overwritten. This leads to a similar effect as memory-
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smearing [59], so our code validates each address and data type before processing it or
using it as a result.

Figure 4.3. class rw t Data Structure

Figure 4.4. class ro t Data Structure

4.1.3. Parsing Instance Variables
Both instance variables and class methods are declared using the entsize list tt
template. From the programmatic perspective, this template provides a generic list interface, but it is actually backed by an array. To implement this, the template stores the
current count of elements, the size of each element, and a pointer to the beginning of the
array of elements. This allows trivial enumeration in our plugins as Volatility has built-in
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Figure 4.5. Code Snippet for Finding Instance Variables
support for arrays.
The set of instance variables for a class are stored as the ivar list t type, which
uses the entsize list tt template. Each instance variable is tracked by an ivar t structure,
which stores the offset, name, and type of the variable. The offset specifies how many
bytes away from the beginning of an objc object instance is the value of a variable stored.
The name and type are stored as strings. Figure 4.5 shows the Python code for locating
the ivar list t data structure. We access each member of the ivar list t array using a for
loop. The structure of the ivar t data structure is shown in Figure 4.6. The code in Figure 4.5 shows how we read the name and type fields of the ivar t data structure.
4.1.4. Decoding Variable Types
To accurately gather the value of a variable, the type string must be interpreted.
These type representations are documented online [60], and our Volatility additions currently support parsing the encoded value of the following types:
• Single byte characters
• Signed and unsigned short integers
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• Signed and unsigned four byte integers
• Signed and unsigned eight byte longs
• Floats and doubles
• Character (string) pointers
• Boolean values
• Class pointers
• Type pointers
• Arrays of supported types
• NSString, NSInteger, NSUrl, NSArray
Recovering the direct integer types is straightforward as they are simply stored
as their little-endian value. Floats and doubles are stored such that the f and d typespecifiers to Python’s struct.unpack can convert them. Pointers to classes are recursively
parsed.
The NS types require separate parsing as they encode the data into separate, undocumented data structures. Binary analysis was required to understand how to recover
variables of these types. Decoding variables of type NSString requires special care as it
can be stored in numerous forms. In one encoding, the string is simply stored starting at
the address of the data structure. In a second encoding, the string begins at offset sixteen (16) of the data structure, and in a third encoding, a pointer to a character string is
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stored at offset sixteen. Our code correctly recovers the target string in all three encodings
that we uncovered during our analysis.
The NSUrl type was discovered to have a NSString that holds the URL at offset
0x18 of its data structure. NSInteger references the integer value directly. NSArrays store
the size of the array at offset 4 and then the elements are listed contiguously after. The
type of each element can be determined by following the isa pointer for each element. For
non-class elements, such as NSInteger, the value can be directly interpreted.

Figure 4.6. ivar t Data Structure

4.1.5. Enumerating Class Methods
The set of methods for a class are stored as the method list t type, which also uses
the entsize list tt template. Figure 4.8 shows how we access the method list t and locate
each member of the array. Each method is represented by a method t data structure. Figure 4.7 shows the layout of the method t which tracks the method’s name sel, parameter
specification types, and implementation pointer imp. As described in Section 4.4.3, our
plugins automatically examine the code of each method to look for calls to often-abused
methods and functions.
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Figure 4.7. method t Data Structure

Figure 4.8. Code Snippet for Finding Methods
4.2. Swift Memory Analysis
4.2.1. Swift and Objective-C Interoperability
Swift supports two modes of operations. The first is standalone and, in this mode,
the runtime does not rely on any Objective-C infrastructure nor does it interact with the
Objective-C runtime. The second mode, which is used on all Apple platforms, enables interoperability between Objective-C and Swift. This allows programs written in the two
languages to natively interact with each other and share APIs and data structures [61, 62].
Since the target of our research was macOS systems, all samples that we analyzed
had interoperability enabled. This allowed us to re-use some of our existing algorithms for
enumerating data, but it also meant that we had to deeply study the Swift-specific parts
of the runtime as well as the precise mechanisms that enable the interoperability.
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4.2.2. Swift Metadata
A significant difference between Swift and Objective-C is that Swift encodes all
information related to classes, variables, methods, and types into metadata records [63].
This required us to develop Volatility code that could parse the metadata records and derive the encoded values. It also required our plugins to be aware of when they are dealing
with purely Objective-C classes versus a Swift class. These specifics are discussed in detail
in the following sections.
Further adding to this complexity, the layout of the metadata structures has
changed substantially between releases of Swift [64]. It was not until Swift 5.1, which was
released in September 2019, that module stability was added [65]. From our understanding of reading related code and documents, this should prevent the addition of future
metadata changes that are not backwards compatible.
4.2.3. Enumerating Loaded Classes
When runtime interoperability is enabled, Swift registers all loaded classes with the
Objective-C runtime. This allows us to enumerate Objective-C and Swift classes using the
same algorithm as described in Section 4.1.1 for Objective-C.
To determine if a loaded class is a Swift class, we check its data value address for
either of the FAST IS SWIFT LEGACY or FAST IS SWIFT STABLE bits being set.
These bits are set by the runtime when Swift classes are registered with the Objective-C
runtime.

46

4.2.4. Locating Class Instances
As described in the Swift Type Metadata documentation [63], Swift class metadata records are also valid objc class structures. When interoperability is enabled, the isa
pointer serves the same purpose as in pure Objective-C, which is to reference the defining
class of the instance. This allows us to follow the isa pointer as described in Section 4.1.2
to determine an instance’s type.
To store the Swift-specific information, the Swift runtime a uses objc class compatible metadata record named TargetClassMetadata. The beginning bytes of this record
match the obj class values and the Swift-specific information is added at the end.
4.2.5. Parsing Instance Variables
Because Swift class metadata records are also valid objc class structures, our initial thought was to recover instance variable information using the technique described in
Section 4.1.3. This approach did not work, however, because Swift does not propagate the
type information for variables into their ivar t structures, instead only propagating the
name and offset fields.
To recover the types of the variables, which is required to properly parse instances
of them, we had to instead rely on the Swift metadata record. Each TargetClassMetadata
class holds a pointer to the nominal type descriptor for the class it represents. This descriptor is of type TargetClassDescriptor, and it holds information about the location of
the methods, variables, superclass, storage size, and more of the target class.
By examining the class descriptor, we can determine the location of the metadata
records used for reflection on the class. These records, of type TargetTypeContextDescrip-
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tor, hold the name and type of each variable of the class. By parsing these records, we can
gather the type information that is purposely set to null in the ivar t structures of Swift
classes. This completes the needed set of type, name, and instance offset for each variable
of a class.
We note that we could also recover the offset of each variable by parsing the
field offset vector of the TargetTypeContextDescriptor, but this is unnecessary as we
already gather it from the ivar t. This would be required though to support Swift in
non-interoperability mode on non-Apple platforms.
4.2.6. Decoding Variable Types
Unlike Objective-C, which stores the type string directly in the type member, Swift
mangles all type names [66]. This prevented direct use of our existing Objective-C variable
parsing code. Instead, we implemented a basic version of Swift’s demangler to support the
mostly common used types. This allows parsing the specific values most often encountered
during our research. We are currently investigating support for full name demangling in
our plugins, but this will be a non-trivial task as the name mangling schema is quite complex and the format changed multiple times between Swift versions. More complete name
demangling is left as future work.
4.2.7. Enumerating Class Methods
Swift provides a number of mechanisms for classes to declare methods [67]. For
the purposes of our research, we divide the many options into two categories, based on
whether or not the method information is propagated to the Objective-C runtime. For
methods that are propagated, we use the technique described in 4.1.5 to recover the class
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method information.
To recover methods that stay solely within the Swift runtime, we must start by inspecting the vtable information provided in the class metadata. This metadata is represented by a TargetVTableDescriptorHeader structure and stores the offset and size of the
vtable. Inside the vtable is a TargetMethodDescriptor structure for every method of the
class. Unfortunately, this method descriptor only stores the function pointer (implementation address in Swift parlance) of the described method.
In order to recover the method name and argument types, we then have to then
cross-reference the function pointer with the symbol table of the analyzed executable.
Volatility provides native support for parsing the symbols of Mach-O objects, which is the
executable file format for Apple devices. Once a matching symbol is found, we then have
the mangled representation, which encodes the function name and parameter types. We
note that this is the same approach as described in [68].
By combining recovery of Objective-C methods and Swift methods, we are able to
recover all methods of a class.
4.3. Malware Testbed Creation
To ensure that our algorithms were capable of detecting a wide variety of realworld malware, we gathered a diverse set of samples that have been discovered in the wild
and that were used in real attacks. Our research of which samples would be useful came
from studying macOS malware analysis resources, such as Objective-See [69] and ESET
reports [70], searches through threat intelligence sources, and through online searches of
reported macOS malware infections and outbreaks.
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Table 4.1. List of Functions and Methods Alerted by Default
Name
Reason
popen
Allows running executables
NSTask::launch
Allows running executables
if nametoindex
Used in gathering MAC addresses
NSCreateObjectFileImageFromMemory
Used for memory-only payload execution
CGEventTapCreate
Used for keylogging
CGEventTapEnable
Used for keylogging
IOHIDManagerRegisterInputValueCallback
Used for keylogging
CGWindowListCreateImage
Used in generating screenshots
CGContextClipToRect
Used in generating screenshots
UIGraphicsGetCurrentContext
Used in generating screenshots
method exchangeImplementations
Used for method swizzling (hooking)
NSWorkspace:: runningApplications
Used to enumerate running processes
For each malware sample, we documented its capabilities and the APIs, classes,
and subsystems that it used to accomplish its malicious actions. This was accomplished
through a mix of studying existing research as well as performing static and dynamic binary analysis. The results of this effort was a deep understanding of the system features
that macOS malware abuses. We then used this knowledge to allow our plugins to generically detect this behaviour in running Objective-C and/or Swift applications.
We document our gathered malware dataset in the remainder of this section and
then showcase our new plugins against them in the following section.

4.3.1. Crisis
As discussed in [41], Crisis was a highly sophisticated malware program used to spy
on users, including recording of audio and web cameras, stealing browser data, and taking
screenshots. It also deployed anti-forensics techniques to hide from live analysis.
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4.3.2. EvilQuest
EvilQuest is a multipurpose malware that combines ransomware features along
with data exfiltration and keylogging [71] [72].
FinSpy
FinSpy is a commercial surveillance tool that has been used against journalists and
political activists throughout many countries in the world [73]. In late 2020, Amnesty International found a copy of this tool for macOS and published analysis of it [74] [75]. The
results showed that the tool is capable of keylogging, recording of system audio, web camera recording, screen recording, sensitive file exfiltration, and more.
4.3.3. Komplex
Komplex is a trojan used by APT28, which is the Russian-backed APT group believed to be responsible for the 2016 Democratic National Committee hack as well as attacks against many other high-profile espionage targets [76]. Komplex provides the operator with information on running processes, the currently logged on user, and the victim
system itself. It also allows the operator to write to any file on the file system or to execute any command.
4.3.4. MacDownloader
MacDownloader is the malware used by an APT group believed to be based out of
Iran [77]. This malware gathers the list of running processes, installed applications, and
saved browser data. It also prompts the user with a fake username and password dialogue
to steal plain-text credentials. Finally, it gathers the victim’s keychain files, which can be
later decrypted using the stolen account credentials.
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4.3.5. MacLoader
MacLoader is a trojan used by an APT group believed to be sponsored by North
Korea. It has the ability to execute memory-only payloads that are delivered by an operator [78].
Realtime-Spy
Realtime-Spy is a commercial spyware suite that allows logging of all user activity,
such as applications executed, keystrokes, emails, and websites visited, as well as capturing screenshots [79]. It came to notoriety when it was leveraged in a phishing campaign
against users of the Exodus cryptocurrency software [79].
4.3.6. Ventir
Ventir is a Trojan found in the wild that provides operators with the ability to enable keylogging, downloading and uploading files, and commands execution [80] [81].
4.3.7. XAgentmacOS
XAgent is another trojan used by APT28, but it provides many more capabilities
than Komplex [82]. Beyond the capabilities of Komplex, it also allows taking screenshots,
stealing Firefox passwords, a remote shell, uploading files over FTP, and reading files from
the file system.
4.4. Analysis Capabilities and Evaluation
Our goal in developing new Volatility plugins was to provide both automated detection of malware in a generic manner as well as empower investigators to add new capabilities specific to their investigations. In this section, we document our suite along with
their algorithms.
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Table 4.2. List of Classes Alerted by Default
Name
Reason
NSPasteboard
Allows clipboard monitoring
AVAudioRecorder
Used to access microphone audio
AVCaptureDeviceInput
Used to monitor web cameras
NSEvent
Used to monitor the keyboard, mouse, and other devices
NSAppleScript
Allows running scripts and gathering data
4.4.1. Analyzing Loaded Classes
Plugin Algorithm
To detect the use of APIs and classes that are often abused for malicious purposes,
we developed the mac analyze classes Volatility plugin. This plugin uses previously described algorithms to enumerate all Objective-C and Swift classes loaded in a process and
then checks if any are in the known-bad list of classes. The plugin comes with a default
list of known-bad classes as described in Table 4.2. This list can also be trivially extended
by the analyst specifying a file name containing a list of classes with the plugin’s –classlist option. This plugin provides an extremely powerful capability as malware must use
runtime-provided APIs to access system hardware, gather system state, and to spawn
other tasks, and the plugin successfully detects processes using such APIs.

Plugin Output
Figure 4.9 shows mac analyze classes against a sample infected with RealTimeSpy (RTS). As can be seen, the use of NSAppleScript by RTS is automatically detected
without requiring hardcoding of RTS-specific indicators.
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Figure 4.9. mac analyze classes Detecting Realtime-Spy
4.4.2. Analyzing Instance Variables
Plugin Algorithm
The second plugin we developed was mac analyze variables. This plugin works by
first using previously described algorithms to record the name, type, and offset of each
instance variable of every loaded class in a process. It then finds each instance of every
class and decodes the variables that are of supported instance types. By default, it will report the name and value of every instance variable of every class. This output can then be
stored in a file and searched by the investigator for patterns of interest and/or indicators
of compromise. The ability to automatically find all strings, which can include file paths,
URLs, command and control configuration data, and more, is a powerful capability that
the plugin provides.
Besides simply extracting all variables, the plugin also supports two modes of operation. The first is through –patterns, which specifies the path of file containing a list
of search terms of interest. This can be used to filter output to only variables pertaining
to a particular investigation or set of IOCs. The second is through –variables, which allows investigators to specify comma-separated lists identifying class names and members
names of interest. The plugin will then only report the presence and decoded contents of
variables matching the list. This allows IOCs of known-bad classes and variables to be automatically found and reported in samples. Such a capability is particularly useful when
an investigator wants to scan many samples in parallel to determine which, if any, are in54

fected. Given the size and scope of modern investigations, these scalable approaches are
required.
Plugin Output
While analyzing the Ventir malware, we noticed that there was a variable of type
NSString named path res inside of its UITimer class. This variable caught our attention
as mac analyze variables showed that it contained a path inside of our lab user account’s
home folder. We investigated further and saw this this path was the location in which the
malware stores its executables and configuration data. Having this information, we could
then make a simple comma separated file containing “UITimer, path res” and use this
file’s path as the argument to –variables. Figure 4.10 shows the output of the plugin when
ran against a Ventir infected memory sample and our given configuration file. As can be
seen, the decoded value is automatically reported as well as the malicious process’ information.

Figure 4.10. mac analyze variables Detecting Ventir

4.4.3. Analyzing Functions and Class Methods
Beyond analyzing just the loaded classes and the current values of the instance
variables, we also wanted to provide deep analysis of the code running inside of ObjectiveC and Swift processes. During investigation of our malware analysis dataset, we realized
that this meant we needed to analyze both the methods associated with each class as well
as the globally accessible methods not associated with a particular class. To meet this
criteria, we developed the mac analyze code plugin, which provides automated analysis
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of code inside of Objective-C and Swift processes and reports usage of functions that are
known to be abused by malware.
4.4.4. Suspicious APIs
During analysis of our malware dataset, we discovered many runtime-provided
APIs that allow for a wide range of system abuse. Most of these were methods not associated with a particular Objective-C or Swift class, but instead are lower level APIs also
available to code in other programming languages, such as C and C++. We did however
find several methods of Objective-C classes that allowed for abuse. To avoid creating false
positives in mac analyze classes by alerting on any usage of these classes, we instead incorporated detecting only uses of the methods that are known to be abused. Table 4.1
lists the methods that mac analyze code considers suspicious and automatically alerts
to when found. As with the other plugins, this list can trivially be extended by analysts
through text files.

Figure 4.11. mac analyze code Detecting Mac Loader

Enumerating Functions to be Analyzed
mac analyze classes finds the functions and methods to analyze through two
sources. First, the methods of all loaded Objective-C and Swift classes are enumerated
using the previously described algorithms. Next, the implementation address pointer for
each method is recorded. The second source used is the symbol table of the executable
being analyzed. This will contain the address of all functions, not just those that are
methods of a class. This was determined to be necessary as we found several instances of
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malware that used global functions as part of its malicious code flow.
Code Analysis Algorithm
The plugin analyzes code through use of the distorm [83] disassembly library. This
library provides the plugin with parsable instructions for each instruction of a function
and any sub-functions that are also called. When the plugin encounters a CALL instruction, which is executed to call a function in a program, it compares the address being
called to the addresses of known suspicious functions. The mapping of known suspicious
functions to their runtime addresses in a particular process is built by enumerating the
symbol table of all libraries mapped into the process. Through this comparison, the plugin
is able to report which processes are hosting code that calls suspicious functions as well as
context of the calling function.
Plugin Output
Figure 4.11 shows the output of mac analyze classes against a memory sample
infected with MacLoader. In the output, it can be seen that the getRunningProcessList
method of the malware’s AuthenticationController class calls the suspicious function
NSWorkspace::runningApplications. This immediately tells the investigator of the process hosting potentially malicious code as well as where to begin any reverse engineering
efforts.
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Chapter 5. .NET Runtime
In this chapter, we extend our research on memory forensics of programming language runtime environments to analyze the .NET runtime for the Windows operating system. According to recent reports, “Microsoft’s Windows is the most widely used computer
operating system in the world with around 70 percent of the market share during the first
half of 2021” [112]. Microsoft has added several security features including the Microsoft
Defender Antivirus, which protects against potentially dangerous apps, files, websites, and
downloads [84]. Though these features provide a measurable amount of protection, they
are not adequate compared to the sophistication of the latest .NET malware. This then
requires the development of new defensive techniques that can detect and analyze .NET
malware. In the next section, we discuss the rising trends in .NET malware, which should
concern Windows users and malware defense researchers alike.
5.1. .NET Malware
The .NET languages are extremely suitable for developing and camouflaging
malware. For example, malware can easily include a VBA Script or C# executable and
pivot to the victim machine unnoticed with the help of some common applications such
as Word, Excel, Powershell, etc. Windows has a huge number of essential applications
which are written in .NET languages like C#, F#, and VB.NET. Notably, Powershell
which is considered one of the key Windows applications, is coded in C#. Other Windows
applications that are developed in C# include Windows Installer, Microsoft Visual Studio,
and KeePass (a highly popular password manager). Since many such applications are
crucial for the operation of the system, they are usually not flagged by antivirus and
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malicious authors can easily hide malicious .NET scripts in these applications. Once
transferred to the victim machine, the malicious payloads can perform activities like keylogging, installing persistent backdoors, lateral movement, monitoring of web cameras and
microphones, and more. These payloads will also often connect to a command and control
server, commonly abbreviated as C&C or C2. These servers allow attackers to control
victim systems in real time.
An example of these powerful attack frameworks is Cobalt Strike. It is used by
governments, businesses, and red team members of organizations to analyze the risk associated with an attack and evaluate post exploitation techniques. Cobalt Strike helps to
establish a C&C connection in order to perform malicious activities.
Similar to Cobalt Strike, Covenant is another C&C framework that develops a reverse connection between the attacker and the victim machine. A Covenant attack usually has the following steps. First, the Covenant Listeners are created. Listeners configure
the addresses to which the reverse connections report. Next, the Covenant Launchers are
used to stage the attack. Launchers generate and download binaries and scripts to help
Covenant transfer the attack payload to a victim machine. These payloads are transferred
to the victim machine in a way that the users or antivirus installed in the system do not
generally detect. The transfer methods can be as simple as sending phishing mails containing the malicious scripts. The Grunts are the implants on the target machine. Once
a complete setup is in place, tasks such as keystroke logging, taking screenshots, opening
command shells, etc. can be performed by Covenant. Figure 5.1 shows the Covenant dashboard once all the connections have been made for a particular session.
Figure 5.2 shows a screenshot of a victim Windows machine taken by the attacking
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Figure 5.1. Covenant Dashboard

Figure 5.2. Screenshot Taken by Covenant
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machine running Covenant. Figure 5.3 shows the output of the key logged within 30 seconds. Frameworks like Cobalt Strike and Covenant may include libraries such as Sharp-

Figure 5.3. Keylogging Done by Covenant

Sploit. This is post exploitation written in C# and can provide features like Mimikatz
(used for credential theft), shell code execution and so on.
Although tools such as Covenant and Cobalt Strike are intended to to help in the
analysis and exploitation of system vulnerabilities to secure them, the features they offer are also extremely useful to malware authors. Features similar to the ones provided
by these offensive security tools are being used extensively by the malware families known
as RATs (Remote Access Trojan). These are remote tools with administrative privileges
which can perform malicious activities. In the last couple of years, new many samples of
RAT were seen that relied partially or exclusively on .NET features. One such malware
sample is Dark Crystal Remote Access Trojan (“dcRAT”). Besides downloading malicious
JavaScript encoded files and malicious screen saver files, this Trojan downloads the exe61

cutable files which help the malware figure out if it is being analyzed on a virtual machine.
dcRAT tries to establish a connection between the attacker and the victim by opening a
URL in Google Chrome. dcRAT also downloads malicious cookies to authenticate itself
with the victim’s Google account [113] [114]
The Royal Road v7 Backdoor is another example of a .NET RAT which targeted
Mongolian authorities. The malware sample was propagated through a document about
COVID19 infections in Russia. Royal Road performed malicious activities, such as allowing the transfer and execution of arbitrary executable files [115].
Another new era of malware that has emerged recently is known as fileless malware. Malware in this category does not write anything to non-volatile storage. Instead,
this type of malware misuses the tools and executables that are already present in the system to initiate the attack. Fileless malware may include documents, scripts, and wrappers, many of which are written easily in .NET languages. These payloads can be executed on the fly using .NET objects. Some variants of fileless malware may be embedded
in the system or browser. Such malware may be considered fileless as they are embedded
even though they might have some traces on the system. However, some variants of fileless malware may be “living off the land” or completely memory-only. Such malware may
use the wrapper executable of another process to execute the malware payload [116]. In
some cases, the process which the malware uses to evade detection may actually be a legitimate process. Some examples of .NET fileless malware include CactusTorch, UrSnif, etc.
According to reports [117], there was a 900% rise in fileless malware in the year 2020.
It is evident that there is an urgent need to develop defensive security tools, which
will help detect and analyze .NET malware. We propose memory forensic techniques that
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can be used to investigate malicious .NET applications and in the following sections, we
discuss the .NET architecture and the layout of the .NET data structures to help understand how these tools are designed. We further explain how these tools detect artifacts
within the process memory .NET applications. Finally we demonstrate how our tools can
be leveraged to detect and understand malware with the help of a proof-of-concept C#
malware.
5.2. .NET Architecture
The .NET Architecture consists of two major components, namely the Common
Language Runtime (CLR) and the Class Library.
5.2.1. The Common Language Runtime (CLR)
CLR is the primary platform that is responsible for core tasks such as managing
memory, thread execution, code execution, code safety verification, compilation, and other
system services in the .NET framework. CLR facilitates memory management with the
help of the automatic garbage collection process. Garbage collection is the process of removal of objects that are no longer required to be used. Automatic memory management
helps resolves memory leaks and pinpoints invalid memory references in applications. CLR
supports Just-In-Time compilation (JIT) which executes computer code “on the fly”; i.e.,
the code is compiled while it is being executed, at runtime. CLR increases performance by
keeping frequently used objects together, thereby reducing memory fragmentation. The
Common Type System (CTS) is the part of the CLR that is responsible for the type and
code verification. The code managed by the CLR have different trust levels which determines what permissions they will have.
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5.2.2. The Class Library
The class library is well integrated with the CLR and provides programmers with a
huge collection of methods to be used in their own code. The class library contains objectoriented methods to assist with string management, data collection, database activity, and
file access. The programmers may choose from the following three types of class libraries:
platform-specific, portable, and .NET Standard libraries [118]. The platform specific libraries work on a single .NET implementation and have access to APIs specific only to
that implementation. The portable libraries work on multiple specified platforms. The
.NET Standard libraries provide the best of both portable and platform specific. They
provide the functionality of a platform-specific library while working on multiple platforms. All these three types of libraries are supported on Mono which is a cross platform.
5.3. .NET Applications
The .NET applications can be broadly classified into three categories, namely Winforms, ASP.Net, and ADO.Net. Winforms are used to develop client-based form applications, such as Notepad. ASP.Net is used for developing web-based applications. ADO.Net
is used to access data and data services from a database server. These applications may
be written in any of the programming languages that are supported by the .NET runtime.
The primary languages that are supported by .NET include C#, F#, and Visual Basic.
Each language has a separate language compiler to first convert these programming languages into a Common Intermediate Language (CIL). The assembly using the CIL can
execute on any system with the .NET Runtime installed. CIL is converted to the native
machine instructions using the JIT compiler.

64

5.4. .NET Under the Hood
In this section, we discuss the CLR internals including several key data structures
that constitute the CLR.
5.4.1. Application Domains
The first step for the CLR before executing any of the managed code is to create three application domains, namely the System Domain, the Shared Domain, and the
named Application Domain. The System Domain creates and initializes the default Application Domain. It is also responsible for loading the system library mscorlib.dll in the
Shared Domain. One of the key goals of the System Domain is to keep track of all the domains in a process and helps in loading and unloading of these domains. The Shared Domain has fundamental types from the System namespace such as Objects, Strings, Enums,
Value Types, Arrays, and Delegates. Although most of the user code is loaded in the Default Domain, dome of the shared user code may also loaded in the Shared Domain. The
Shared domain contains an assembly map that can be used as a lookup table for managing shared dependencies of assemblies being loaded into the Default Domain. The Default
Domain is an instance of the Application Domain that contains all the user created application code. Usually only a single domain is created by an application. Each Application
Domain contains the following: Security Descriptor, High-Frequency Heap, Low-Frequency
Heap, Stub Heap, Handle Table, Large Object Heap Handle Table, Interface Vtable Map
Manager, and Assembly Cache.

65

5.4.2. Loader Heaps
The artifacts accessed by the CLR are loaded in the Loader Heaps. The more
frequently accessed artifacts are allocated on a High Frequency Heap, eg., MethodTables,
MethodDesc, FieldDesc, and Interface Maps. The less frequently accessed data structures,
such as EEClass and ClassLoader get allocated on a Low Frequency Heap. The Stub
Heap has stubs to facilitate Code Access Security (CAS), Component Object Model
(COM), and P/Invoke. CAS helps to prevent code which is not trusted from performing
privileged actions. The COM wrapper calls allow calls to COM objects from managed
code. P/Invoke allows access to structs, callbacks, and functions in unmanaged libraries
from managed code. CLR stores the objects with sizes greater than 85,000 bytes on the
Large Object Heap (LOH) while the objects with sizes smaller than 85,000 bytes are
stored on the GCHeap. This process of separating large objects from small objects help in
optimization and garbage collection. The LOH is collected only on full garbage collections,
whereas the GCHeap is collected on all garbage collections.
5.4.3. Metadata Streams
CLR has five streams that contain most of the runtime specific data. First is the
Metadata stream which has predefined contents and structure. It stores all the information on the types, methods, fields, properties and events in the assembly. Second is the
Strings heap where all the namespace, types, and member names are stored. Types are
the fundamental unit of programming in .NET and can be implicitly generated or created by the programmer. The User String Heap stores all the strings used in code directly.
All the strings a user embeds in the source code end up in here. This stream is only refer-
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enced from method bodies. The Globally Unique Identifier Heap (GUID Heap) exclusively
stores GUIDs used throughout the assembly. GUIDs are 16 byte unique integers assigned
to the .NET objects so that they can be identified using these integers. The Blob heap is
primarily used for storing pure binary data such as method signatures, generic instances,
etc.
5.4.4. Metadata Tables
The metadata information in the .NET runtime is organised into 45 metadata tables. The metadata tables are shown in Table 5.4.4.
Out of these 45 tables, the most important ones are the TypeDef table, MethodDef table, and the FieldDef table. The TypeDef table contains the information about the
classes. The MethodDef table contains the information about the methods whereas the
FieldDef table contains the information about the fields.
5.4.5. Assembly
Assemblies are the building blocks of a .NET Application. Each assembly has the
manifest file that contains the metadata for the types and resources. Without the manifest
file, the CIL code cannot be executed. Each assembly may contain one or more modules.
We wrote a plugin to find the pointer to the Manifest file of an assembly. This is the address of the Manifest file. The output of our plugin is shown in Figure 5.4.

Figure 5.4. Manifest File
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Table 5.1. List of Metadata Tables
#
Name
00
Module
01
TypeRef
02
TypeDef
04
Field
06
MethodDef
08
Param
09
InterfaceImpl
10
MemberRef
11
Constant
12
CustomAttribute
13
FieldMarshal
14
DeclSecurity
15
ClassLayout
16
FieldLayout
17
StandAloneSig
18
EventMap
20
Event
21
PropertyMap
23
Property
24
MethodSemantics
25
MethodImpl
26
ModuleRef
27
TypeSpec
28
ImplMap
29
FieldRVA
32
Assembly
33
AssemblyProcessor
34
AssemblyOS
35
AssemblyRef
36
AssemblyRefProcessor
37
AssemblyRefOS
38
File
39
ExportedType
40
ManifestResource
41
NestedClass
42
GenericParam
44 GenericParamConstraint
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5.4.6. Module
Modules are the building blocks of an assembly. They contain the classes, methods, and fields. We wrote a plugin to find the name and some of the pointers from a module. In Figure 5.5, the Simple name is the pointer to the module’s name. We dereference
the name pointer to get the module name. The file is the pointer to the PEFile. The Assembly is a back pointer to the assembly which loads the module. The TypeDefToMethodTableMap is the pointer to the lookup map which gives the MethodTable addresses. This
process has been explained later in Section 5.5.3. The m MethodDefToDescMap is the
pointer to the lookup map which gives the MethodDesc addresses. This process has been
explained in Section 5.5.4. The m FieldDefToDescMap is the pointer to the lookup map
which gives the FieldDesc addresses. This process has been explained in Section 5.5.5

Figure 5.5. Module Data Structure

5.4.7. MethodTable
In a .NET application, each class has a MethodTable. All the object instances of
the same class will point to the same MethodTable. The MethodTable also contains the
number of interfaces implemented, the interface map for method dispatch, the number of
slots in the method table, and a table of slots that point to the implementations.
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5.4.8. EEClass
One of the key data structure of the Common Language Runtime is the EEClass.
The EEClass is created by the ClassLoader from the metadata before the MethodTable
is laid out. The MethodTable contains a pointer to the EEClass. Less frequently accessed
information like names, fields, and offsets needed by Just-in-Time (JIT) compile functions
are loaded in EEClass, whereas frequently accessed information required at runtime like
Vtable slots and Garbage Collection information are loaded in the MethodTable. There is
one EEClass for each type (interface, class, abstract class, array, and struct) loaded into
an AppDomain.
Each EEClass is a node of a tree tracked by the execution engine. The Common
Language Runtime uses this tree to navigate through the EEClass structures for purposes
including class loading, MethodTable layout, type verification, and type casting. The childparent relationship between EEClasss is established based on the inheritance hierarchy,
whereas parent-child relationships are established based on the combination of inheritance
hierarchy and class loading sequence [87].
5.5. .NET Runtime Analysis
The Volatility Framework does provide a suite of memory analysis tools to analyze
the Windows operating system, but currently none of these plugins can provide information related to a particular application written in .NET languages such as C#. Given the
use of C# in many Windows applications and the fact that it is often used in memoryonly malware, its extremely crucial to deeply analyze the .NET runtime for forensic investigations. To offer full analysis of a .NET application we retrieved the following informa-
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tion.
• The Default Application Domain
• The Domain Assembly and the Module
• The classes within a .NET process
• The methods associated with the process
• The fields present within a process
• The values contained by the fields
In the rest of the section we describe how we find the required information. To understand the layout of the .NET runtime data structures, we did a manual review of the
.NET runtime source code [85]. This was a very time-consuming process, but it was necessary to develop the deep familiarity with the data structures required to develop new investigative techniques for .NET. As the CLR contains an enormous amount of data structures, it was impossible to analyze each of them manually from the source code. We therefore retrieved the information from the coreclr PDB file. PDB files contain the types and
symbol offsets for data structures defined by an application. For modules for which Microsoft chooses to support full debugging, the corresponding PDB files are hosted on the
Microsoft Symbol Server.
Our analysis focused on coreclr.dll, as it is the dynamic linked library containing
all the code and data related to the CLR. We used the DLL file located in the %PROGRAM FILES% as an input for the dotnet-symbol tool to download the coreclr PDB file
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containing all the debug symbols from the Microsoft symbol server. To parse the coreclr
PDB file into a human readable form, we used the llvm-pdbutil. We downloaded the source
code for llvm and installed llvm-pdbutil using Visual Studio. A detailed process for this
conversion can be found in [95]. We used the pretty command along with the types subcommand. The complete list of the commands and the sub-commands that can be used to
parse PDB files can be found here in [96]. We initially used a simple, non-malicious program to test our plugins. This is a .NET application used to calculate the area of a rectangle.
5.5.1. Finding the Application Domain
We find the Application Domain (AppDomain) by locating the AppDomain::
m pTheAppDomain variable, whose address can be obtained from the PDB file. On
locating the AppDomain, we can further find its name using the m friendlyName field.
5.5.2. The Domain Assembly and Module containing user created data
The assemblies can be accessed by traversing the linked list m Assemblies. Each
element of the linked list is a struct of Type Assembly. The m pAssembly field provides a
pointer to the Domain Assembly.
We locate the manifest file in the Domain Assembly with the help of the
m pManifestFile variable. We can trace the name of the Domain Assembly from the
m identity member of the m pManifestFile structure. The m identity structure contains
the m path field which contains the name of the Domain Assembly.
The Domain Assembly may contain one or more modules. Most of the important
classes and structs are stored in the master module. We locate the master module with
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Figure 5.6. Source Code for Example Program

73

the help of the m pModule field. The m pSimpleName gives the name of the module.
5.5.3. The classes within a .NET process
To thoroughly investigate .NET runtime applications, it is crucial that we enumerate the classes within a .NET module. This can be achieved by inspecting the following
key data structures:
1. The MethodTable for each class
2. The TypeDef Metadata table holding class information
Inspecting the MethodTable for each class
We discussed about the MethodTable structure in section 5.4.7. To get the MethodTable of the classes we use LookupMaps. From the Module data structure, we find the
address of the TypeDefToMethodTableMap. The LookupMaps contain three primary fields.
First is the pNext pointer that helps to traverse the list of MethodTables by pointing to
the next element. Second is the pTable pointer that points to the list of MethodTable
addresses. Third is the dwCount which is the maximum number of entries that can be
present in the list of relative virtual address offsets. With the help of these addresses, we
are able to find the MethodTable structures for the classes.
In the MethodTable structure, we find the field m wToken. This token contains a
unsigned short integer value which when masked with the METHODTABLE TOKENOVERFLOW value, which is 0xffff, gives the index to find a particular record in the
metadata database in memory. The masking is done to make sure that the token value
does not overflow. In Table 5.4.4, the third entry (marked with 02) is the TypeDef metadata table. This metadata table holds the information about the classes. To enumerate
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the classes present in the process, we need to extract the TypeDef table.
Inspecting the TypeDef Metadata table holding class information
There are two structures that hold information on metadata tables. First is the
m TableDefs structure. This is an array of length 45 and holds the metadata for the 45
Metadata tables in the metadata database in memory. Second is the m Tables structure.
This array is also of length 45 in order to accommodate the information in the 45 Metadata tables. m Tables contains the actual data for the tables.
These two aforementioned table arrays are parallel arrays that map into each other,
e.g., index 01 of m TableDefs will hold the metadata information on the TypeRef table,
while index 01 of m Tables will hold the actual data on the TypeRef table. Similarly, index 02 of m TableDefs will hold the metadata information on the TypeDef table, while
index 02 of m Tables will hold the actual data on the TypeRef table, and so on.
The TypeDef table which holds the class information has the following structure.
Each class forms a record (row) in the TypeDef table e.g., if there are four classes in a
given process, the TypeDef metadata table will consist of four records, one for each class.
There are seven fields (columns) in the TypeDef table. These fields are defined in the
TypeDefRec structure. Out of these columns, we are interested in the second column as
it contains the offsets to the string table for the names of the classes.
Extracting the class names using the MethodTable and TypeDef MetaData
table
All the strings across the AppDomain are stored in one location - the String Pool
in the String Heap. The Core Language Runtime heavily follows an optimization technique known as string interning, where only a single entry of a String are stored. String
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Interning saves memory by having only a single instance of the string for a given literal
across all the application domains. The first time a string literal is encountered, an entry
for the string is made into the String Table. The next time the same string literal is encountered, no new entry is created. Instead, there is a reference to the previous entry.
The strings in the interned String Pool are sorted in a particular manner in order
to be retrieved easily. To retrieve the actual strings for the class names we first need the
segment in which the string is located. This segment information is available from the
m pSegData array. Once we locate the segment in which the string is located, we need to
find the index to the first character of the null terminated string in order to retrieve the
string. The remainder of this subsection describes how this goal was accomplished. Please
refer to the Figure 5.7 for the output values for our memory sample running the Area program.

Figure 5.7. Code Output Snippet
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To find the segment of the String Pool where the class name is located, we must
first find the m LiteWeightStgdb structure. In Figure 5.7, this is the ‘LiteWeightStgdb’ address. This structure points to the String Heap. To locate the string database, we find the
Module address using the technique discussed in Section 5.5.2. Each module has a pointer
to the PEFile which contains the m pMDImport field which offsets into the required string
database structure. In Figure 5.7, the m pMDImport is the ‘md’ address. Once we locate
the String Heap, we can access the String Pool which is divided into segments of a specific
segment size. In Figure 5.7, we see the String Pool as the ‘pool’. We can find the segment
data using the m pSegData field and the segment size using the m cbSegSize field of the
String Pool data structure.
On obtaining the segment data and segment size, we proceed to find the string index which is an offset to the first character of the string. The string index is calculated
from the address of the record and the address of the field in the TypeDef table. The address of the record is calculated using the following:
record address = B + R ∗ t
Here, B is the table base address of the TypeDef Table. R is the value of m cbRec
obtained from the m TableDefs array, and t is the row index of the particular class.
The base address B of the TypeDef table is calculated from the m Tables array
mentioned earlier in this subsection. Each element of the m Tables array is a TableRO
structure. To find the class information, we look at the TableRO structure at index 2 of
the m Tables array as the TypeDef table is the third table in the m Tables array list. The
m pData field of the TableRO structure gives the base address of the TypeDef table.
The number of records R in the TypeDef table is calculated from the m TableDefs
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array. Each element of the m TableDefs array is a CMiniTableDef structure. We find the
CMiniTableDef structure at index 2 of the m TableDefs array as the m TableDefs array maps into the m Tables array and the TypeDef table is again the third table in the
m TableDefs array list. The CMiniTableDef structure has a m cbRec field which is an unsigned integer value. In Figure 5.7, it is shown as the ‘cbRec’ value.
The index t is the index of the class which is 1 in our case.
The address of the field is calculated with the help of the CMiniTableDef structure. Along with the record information, the CMiniTableDef structure also has Column
information. The column is specified by the m pColDefs field which is a data structure
of type CMiniColDef. The Name is the second column of the TypeDef table. From the
CMiniColDef, we find the m oColumn which specifies the location of the string index. The
m oColumn is the pointer to an integer that holds the offset of the m pSegData array.
On adding the record address with the address of the m oColumn we get the string
index. In Figure 5.7, the m oColumn is shown as the ‘m col’ value. This string index has
to be masked according to the location of the string. The string is masked with 0xffffff. If
it is greater than the segment size calculated earlier, it is further masked with 0xffff. The
value of the mask is determined by the m iStringsMask. Adding the masked string index
to the segment base address gives the pointer to the first character of the string. We can
read the string characters until we find the null terminator to obtain the string.
5.5.4. The methods associated with the process
To enumerate the method names present in a process, we need to analyze the following key data structures:
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1. The MethodDesc structure for each method
2. The MethodDef Metadata Table holding the method information

Figure 5.8. Method Output Snippet

To get the Method descriptors for the methods within an application, we again use
the LookupMaps. From the Module data structure, we find the address of the MethodDefToDescMap. The structure of the LookupMaps has been explained in section 5.4.7.
The dwCount gives us the count of Method Descriptors associated with the MethodDef
table. The pTable pointer is used to point to the first method descriptor address, while
pNext is used to iterate through the method descriptor address array. Adding these offsets
to their location base address gives the actual MethodDesc pointers. We can thus find the
MethodDesc objects at these pointer locations.
The MethodDesc structure contains the m wSlotNumber. This unsigned short integer value which when masked with 0xfc00 gives the index to find a particular MethodDef record in the metadata database in memory. If we look at the the Metadata tables
79

mentioned in Section 5.4.4, the fifth table (marked with 06) is the MethodDef table. This
metadata table holds the information about the methods. To enumerate the methods
present in the process, we need to extract the MethodDef table.
The structure of the MethodDef table is as follows. Each method will form a record
(row) in the MethodDef table e.g., if there are 10 methods in a given process, the MethodDef metadata table will consist of 10 records, one for each method. There are 8 fields
(columns) in the MethodDef table. These fields are defined in the MethodRec structure.
Out of these columns, we are interested in the fourth column as it contains the offsets to
the string table for the names of the methods.
To get the actual method name strings, we can use a technique similar to finding
the class name strings. The segment information can be found from the String Pool in the
same manner as described in section. The calculation of the address of the records and
the columns follows the same technique we used while retrieving the class strings. The
base address of the MethodDef table is extracted from index 5 of the m Tables array. The
record information can be obtained from m cbRec field of the CMiniTableDef structure located at the index 5 of the m TableDefs array list. We get the index information from the
slot numbers calculated from the MethodDesc structure. On multiplying the index with
the m cbRec integer value, we obtain an offset which when added to the base address of
the MethodDef table gives the record information. The field information is calculated from
the CMiniColDef structure. Since the Name field is the fourth column in the MethodRec,
the pointer to the base of this column is obtained by adding the m pColDefs object offset
to the size of the CMiniColDef multiplied by 3 as there are 3 columns before the required
Name column. Once we find the string index by adding the record address to the column
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address given by m oColumn, we can mask it according to the segment size and find the
offset to the first character of the null terminated method name string.
5.5.5. Finding the fields present within a process
To enumerate the field names present in a process, we need to analyze the following
key data structures:
1. FieldDesc structure
2. FieldDef Metadata Table

Figure 5.9. Field Output Snippet

To obtain the Field descriptors for the fields within a process, we implement a technique similar to the one we used to identify the method descriptors. From the Module
data structure, we find the address of the FieldDefToDescMap which is a LookupMap similar to the MethodDefToDescMap. The structure of the LookupMaps has been explained in
section 5.4.7. The dwCount of the FieldDefToDesc gives us the count of Field Descriptors
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associated with the FieldDef table. The pTable pointer is used to point to the first field
descriptor offset, while pNext is used to iterate through the field descriptor address array. With the help of these FieldDesc pointers, we can find the FieldDesc objects at these
pointer locations.
The FieldDesc structure contains the m mb. This unsigned short integer value
which gives the index to find a particular FieldDef record in the metadata database
in memory. If we look at the the Metadata tables mentioned in 5.4.4, the fourth table
(marked with 04) is the FieldDef table. This metadata table holds the information about
the fields. To enumerate the fields present in the process, we need to extract the FieldDef
table.
The structure of the FieldDef table is as follows. Each field will form a record
(row) in the FieldDef table e.g., if there are 20 fields in a given process, the FieldDef
metadata table will consist of 20 records, one for each field. There are 5 fields (columns)
in the FieldDef table. These fields are defined in the FieldRec structure. Out of these
columns, we are interested in the second column as it contains the offsets to the string
table for the names of the fields.
To get the actual field name strings, we can use a technique similar to finding
method name strings. The segment information can be found from the String Pool in the
same manner as described previously. The calculation of the address of the records and
the columns follows the same technique we used while retrieving the class strings. The
base address of the FieldDef table is extracted from index 4 of the m Tables array. The
record information can be obtained from m cbRec field of the CMiniTableDef structure
located at the index 4 of the m TableDefs array list. We get the index information from
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the m mb calculated from the FieldDesc structure. On multiplying the index with the
m cbRec integer value, we obtain an offset which when added to the base address of the
FieldDef table gives the record information. The field information is calculated from the
CMiniColDef structure. Since the Name field is the second column in the MethodRec, the
pointer to the base of this column is obtained by adding the m pColDefs object offset to
the size of the CMiniColDef as there is one column before the required Name column.
Once we find the string index by adding the record address to the column address given
by m oColumn, we can mask it according to the segment size and find the offset to the
first character of the null terminated field name string.
5.5.6. Finding the values present in the fields
We have already established the fact that each class has a MethodTable. We can
find the MethodTable address using the technique mentioned in 5.5.3. All the instances
of a class will have a pointer m pMethTab that points back to its MethodTable. To find
the values present in the fields, we need to utilize Volatility’s capability to search the
heap regions. As explained in Section 5.4.2 all objects are allocated on the heap. We
can therefore scan the heap for all the instances of a class. The subsequent pointers after
the m pMethTab belong to fields of the class. Depending on the type of the field we will
either get a value or a reference, To find the type of the field we look into the Blob Pool
in the Blob Heap. The Blob Heap contains only binary data values. We calculate the
blob pointer using the same technique as the string pointer (in 5.5.3). Instead of the
m iStringMask, we use the textitm iBlobMask. The first byte pointed by the blob pointer
is an encoded integer. We are interested in the next byte which represents the signature
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of the field. We look up this byte value in the CorElementType table, eg., a 32 bit integer
will be represented by 0x8 in the Blob Pool whereas a string will be represented by 0xe.
Depending on the type, we find the values of the respective fields, eg., in case of an integer
the subsequent field pointer will directly contain the value while in case of a string the
subsequent field pointer will contain another pointer to the first character of the null
terminated string.
5.6. .NET Plugin Implementation
Following the detailed analysis discussed in Section 5.5, we were able to create appropriate Volatility plugins. The dotnet assemblies is used to find information about the
assemblies present in the process. The dotnet classes plugin enumerates the classes in a
given process. The dotnet methods finds the methods in the given class. The dotnet fields
finds the fields in the given class. The dotnet remote server plugin is used to find the values of the fields related to our POC command and control server application.
We test our plugins against a memory image running our POC (Proof Of Concept) malware sample. A proof of concept malware does not cause any harm to the system but is often used to demonstrate the capabilities that real-world malware possesses
against a system. First, we analyze the memory sample using the dotnet assemblies plugin. This give us all the loaded assemblies. The output of the plugin is shown in Figure
5.10. We find that most of them are the usual Windows system dynamic linked libraries
found in the ‘Program files’ sub-directory. However, the c2app.dll file looks suspicious
as it is loaded from the User directory and not the System directory. At this point, we
do not know whether it is malicious or not. However, we are interested in investigating
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Figure 5.10. Output of dotnet assemblies Plugin
this assembly because of its unusual location and uncommon name. Next, we use our dot-

Figure 5.11. Output of dotnet classes Plugin

net classes plugin to look at the classes present in the process. The output of this plugin
is shown in 5.11. We are particularly interested in the classes of the c2app assembly DLL.
We find that c2app has two classes, namely remote server and Program. This arouses our
suspicion that this DLL has something to do with a remote server. We now suspect that
‘C2’ stands for ‘Command and Control’. There is nothing to confirm our suspicions except
to dig deeper and find the fields associated with these classes. We apply our dotnet fields

85

plugin to the memory sample. The output of our plugin is shown in Figure 5.12. We now

Figure 5.12. Output of dotnet fields Plugin

see that the application has something to do with a server url and a server port. We are
curious to see the values to which these fields are set. We use the dotnet remote server

Figure 5.13. Output of dotnet remote server Plugin

plugin to extract the values of the fields. We find that the port is set to 17442. We find
that our POC malware sets the url to https://amaonaws.com/image.gif. The POC malware uses an incorrect spelling of Amazon AWS. This is a commonly used malicious techniques, where domains registered for use with malware closely mirror real ones.
5.6.1. Detecting Memory-Only .NET Malware
During our analysis we realized that our plugins are capable of detecting memoryonly malware, as well. The prime difference between on-disk malware and memory-only
malware is that the textitm path field of the PEFile data structure of on-disk malware is
86

a valid string whereas the textitm path field of the PEFile data structure of memory-only
malware is an empty string. Even for the memory-only malware, we can extract the executable from memory to disk, to then support binary analysis. To get the base address of
the PE of the memory-only malware we look inside the PEImage structure. The PEImage structure contains an array called m pLayouts, where each element has the structure
PEImageLayout. We find the member m base from the first element of the array which
reveals the base address. We then extract the memory-only malware onto the disk using
an existing Volatility plugin:dlldump. Once the memory-only malware is extracted to the
disk, all of the capabilities to inspect the .NET data are the same.
Figure 5.14 shows the source code of our proof-of-concept memory only malware.
We see that the remote server part of this malware has no contents in main and all its
values are initialized with the help of constructors. The loader for this malware is shown
in Figure 5.15. Although in this case we read from a file,in a real malware scenario, the
stream of bytes can be easily populated from a web browser keeping no trace of the malware on disk. We use the Load function to load the data in memory. We find the type of
the assembly data using the method GetType and use the Activator class we create an object. Figure 5.16 shows the output from our proof-of-concept memory-only malware.
The analysis of the POC malware and POC memory-only malware helps to understand how our plugins help to provide an insight into the activities of .NET malware.
From our analysis, we can conclude that our POC is involved in malicious network activities. In the beginning of this section, we discussed the different types of .NET malware
and attack frameworks. Our next goal will be to analyze the different attack frameworks
and real-life .NET malware. We will also create a database of malicious methods so that
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Figure 5.14. Source Code for Memory-only Remote Server
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Figure 5.15. Source Code for Memory-only Loader
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Figure 5.16. Source Code for Memory-only Malware Output
we can compare if the application being analyzed uses any of the methods used by other
malware. It will be interesting to see how our plugins work against the latest “living off
the land” malware.
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Chapter 6. Conclusions
Memory forensics will continue to be a critical technique in the fields of digital
forensics, incident response, and malware analysis. Given the rise of memory-only malware
and exploits across all platforms, there is a strong need for memory forensics to recover
as much data as possible from application samples written in various programming languages. In this thesis, we have presented novel memory forensic methods for automated
analysis of modern runtime environments namely the Objective-C and Swift runtime, and
the .NET runtime.
We began by documenting our efforts to incorporate analysis of the macOS page
queues into memory forensics. We chose Volatility as our research framework given its
popularity in the industry as well as academia. The result of our work is the seamless integration of page queue analysis into all existing and future macOS plugins. As demonstrated in the results of analysis of stacks, heaps, and process executables, a substantial
number of pages that were previously inaccessible are now made readily available. This
will allow investigators to gather a much richer and more complete set of data and artifacts to perform thorough analysis.
We have described our analysis of the Objective-C and Swift runtimes to find detailed information related to classes, methods, and instance variables, which is crucial for
memory analysis of macOS applications. We also deeply analyzed the .NET runtime to
find information in memory for applications written in .NET languages like C#. We described how modern malware can abuse .NET’s ubiquity to camouflage scripts and have
them executed on the fly. We thoroughly analyzed the .NET runtime data structures to
help create memory tools that can investigate .NET malware. The tools developed as a
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part of this effort allow for investigators of all skill levels to detect malware and other suspicious code running on a system in a straightforward manner. These plugins also allow
for automated extraction of variable data of applications, which can assist in investigations
beyond malware, such as insider threats. The plugins are all easily extensible through basic text files to support filtering of output and incorporation of IOC (Indicator of Compromise) data.
Given the popularity of macOS and Windows operating systems in the corporate
environment as well as the continued rise in home environments, deeper inspection of
these userland runtimes is now a required feature of memory analysis frameworks. Our
work is a crucial step towards finding vulnerable features provided by these widely used
language runtimes which can be used by userland malware to gain control over the host
machine. In the future, we will continue our fight to keep up with the sophistication of
modern malware and create more powerful tools to help detect and analyze malware
through memory forensics. We have developed this capability for the Volatility framework,
and our goal is to have these capabilities integrated directly into the framework. This will
allow the capabilities to be usable by the entire digital forensics and incident response
community. We strongly believe that our work is a step forward in memory forensic
research and a step closer to making the world safer from cyber attacks.
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